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 ABSTRACT 
The Introduction of New Product Qualities by Incumbent Firms:  Market 
Proliferation versus Cannibalization 
by Ralph Siebert* 
This study analyzes the optimal provision of goods in a market characterized by 
vertical product differentiation. We consider a duopoly model in which 
incumbents may introduce a new product with certain quality, and decide 
whether to keep or to withdraw the existing product from the market. We find 
that the strategic and cannibalization effects dominate, such that no room is left 
for discrimination among consumers. The innovator always withdraws the 
existing product from the market, in order to reduce price competition and to 
avoid cannibalizing its new product demand. In contrast to horizontally 
differentiated markets, firms are better off not to offer a range or interval of 
product qualities in vertically differentiated markets. Hence, firms fare better, 
despite offering a smaller variety of goods. 
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 ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Die Einfuehrung neuer Qualitaetsprodukte von Unternehmen:  
Marktnischenbesetzung versus Kannibalisierung der Nachfrage 
Diese Studie analysiert das optimale Angebot von Guetern, die sich in der 
Qualitaet untescheiden. Wir betrachten ein Modell, in dem zwei insaessige 
Unternehmen neue Produkte mit unterschiedlicher Qualitaet in den Markt 
einfuehren koennen. Zudem koennen die Innovatoren entscheiden, ob ihre 
existierenden Produkte weiterhin im Markt angeboten oder abgezogen werden 
sollen. Wir zeigen, dass strategische Effekte und Kannibalisierungseffekte keine 
Diskriminierung zwischen den Konsumenten zulassen. Der Innovator zieht das 
existierende Produkt immer aus dem Markt, um einen erhoehten 
Preiswettbewerb und eine Kannibilisierung der eigenen Nachfrage zu 
vermeiden. Im Gegensatz zu horizontal differenzierten Maerkten, stellen sich 
Unternehmen in vertikal differenzierten Maerkten besser, eine geringere 
Produktvielfalt anzubieten. 
iv 
1 Introduction
Many industries are characterized by oligopolistic competition with diﬀerentiated
products. Technological progress motivates firms to introduce new products with
diﬀerent characteristics. Consumers’ valuation of those product characteristics dis-
tinguish horizontal from vertical product diﬀerentiation settings. In horizontally
diﬀerentiated markets, we frequently observe that incumbent firms introduce im-
proved goods of higher quality level and keep their existing product in the market.1
Prominent examples, characterized by a high degree of market coverage, are the
automobile industry, insurance markets, and the food industry. In these industries,
firms’ optimal product provision might be determined by proliferating the product
space in order to discriminate among consumers for gaining on demand (see, e.g.,
Champsaur and Rochet (1989), Shaked and Sutton (1990), Anderson and de Palma
(1988) plus Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse (1992)).
In vertically diﬀerentiated markets, however, incumbents often introduce new
products of higher quality and withdraw their existing products from the market.2
A prominent example is the electronics and telecommunications industry: new PCs
or laptops with faster processors, new cellular phones with longer ‘stand by time’,
new computer screens with higher resolutions, and new software with improved
applications enter the markets, and existing products are withdrawn. In these in-
dustries, firms may have less of an incentive to proliferate the product space while
keeping the existing products in the market, see, e.g., Moorthy and Png (1992).
The aim of this study is to explain firms’ incentives to proliferate the product
space in vertically diﬀerentiated product markets.3 We analyze which eﬀects de-
termine the innovator’s decision to keep or to withdraw existing products from the
market.4
This study presents a duopoly model in which incumbents may introduce a new
product with certain quality. The innovator may keep or withdraw the existing
product from the market and firms set prices in the product market. As solving for
product qualities in closed form is rather diﬃcult, we implicitly derive the eﬀects
1In horizontal product diﬀerentiation models consumers’ preferences are distributed over a
spectrum of products in which each consumer chooses the closest product. Dixit and Stiglitz
(1977), Salop (1979), and Brander and Eaton (1984) are some pioneering studies in this field.
2In models characterized by vertical product diﬀerentiation all consumers rank qualities in the
same order, but diﬀer in their income. Mussa and Rosen (1978), Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979
and 1980) and Shaked and Sutton (1982) are the first studies in this area. Choi and Shin (1992)
modify the vertical diﬀerentiation model by Shaked and Sutton (1982) allowing for an uncoverd
market. Caplin and Nalebuﬀ (1991) provide a short overview of diﬀerent approaches on discrete
choice models. For more recent contributions in the area of vertical product diﬀerentiation, see
Hoppe and Lee (2003), Hoppe and Lehmann-Grube (2001), and Lehmann-Grube (1997) and the
cited literature therein.
3There is a large body of recent empirical work focusing on the introduction of new products.
Prominent examples are Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1993), Berry and Waldvogel (1999), Davis
(2002), Hausman (1997), and Petrin (2002), among many others.
4For further information regarding the distinction between horizontal and (pure) vertical dif-
ferentiation, see also Cremer and Thisse (1991), Champsaur and Rochet (1989), and Constantatos
and Perrakis (1997).
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impacting the innovators decision on their optimal provision of goods.
This paper confirms that the basic result established by Champsaur and Rochet
(1989) for horizontal diﬀerentiation also holds in a pure vertical diﬀerentiation set-
ting with uniformly distributed preferences. The Chamberlinian incentive (strategic
eﬀect) to isolate oneself from other firms’ products is so strong that an innovator
diﬀerentiates its products from those of its competitors in order to soften price com-
petition. Therefore, in innovation cases, in which the innovator’s existing product
is adjacent to the rival’s product, it better withdraws. However, in contrast to hori-
zontal models, the innovators incentives to diﬀerentiate their products is not limited
towards rivals’ products, but also holds among its own goods. Moreover, innova-
tors withdraw their existing products close to their own goods, in order to avoid
cannibalizing their own product demand and to soften price competition towards
their own products. We show that the strategic and cannibalization eﬀects are so
strong, that no room is left for discrimination (demand eﬀect) among consumers;
they earn higher profits despite a smaller variety of goods. Consequently, in contrast
to horizontally diﬀerentiated markets, firms are worse oﬀ to oﬀer a range or interval
of product qualities in vertically diﬀerentiated product markets.
It is well established that models characterized by horizontal diﬀerentiation may
provide diﬀerent results than vertical diﬀerentiation settings. For instance, Shaked
and Sutton (1983) show that in vertical product diﬀerentiation models an upper
bound on the number of firms exists, in contrast to the horizontal models in which
the market can support an arbitrarily large number of firms. Hence, the distinction
between horizontal and vertical product diﬀerentiation might be crucial as well,
regarding the optimal provision of products in the market.
We may expect that an innovator’s choice to keep or to withdraw the existing
product is determined by the demand eﬀect. An innovator may prefer to proliferate
the product space in order to discriminate among consumers which attracts more
consumers and increases sales. Up to this point, the existing literature on product
proliferation with the purpose of discrimination among consumers is mostly char-
acterized by a monopolist who decides on a product range oﬀered in the market,
see, e.g., Mussa and Rosen (1978). They show that a protected monopolist may de-
cide to leave parts of the market unserved and does not engage in complete market
coverage.
A further aspect, the innovator may account for, is given by keeping the exist-
ing product in the market which increases price competition (strategic eﬀect). The
principle of ‘maximal product diﬀerentiation’ by Shaked and Sutton (1982) illus-
trates that the benefit to firms by moving product qualities apart from each other
in order to soften price competition (strategic eﬀect), outweighs the market share
gained through discriminating among consumers and proliferating the product space
through moving qualities closer to each other (demand eﬀect). This trade oﬀ is also
highlighted in Champsaur and Rochet (1989). In a general horizontal product dif-
ferentiation model they analyze the incentives of multiproduct duopolists’ to oﬀer
diﬀerent intervals (ranges) of product qualities. The authors show that both firms
will diﬀerentiate their product lines from those of their competitors according to the
principle of ‘maximal product diﬀerentiation’. Therefore, the Chamberlinian incen-
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tive, or the strategic eﬀect dominates the demand eﬀect for intermediate qualities
which induces a gap between both firms’ product lines. For the purpose of generality,
they exclude the case of pure vertical diﬀerentiation, as originated by Gabszewicz
and Thisse (1979) and Shaked and Sutton (1982). Therefore, we analyze to what
extent this result also applies to a pure vertical diﬀerentiation setting.
Finally, an innovator’s decision on existing products depends on the impact on
its new product demand when keeping the existing product in the market, e.g., the
cannibalization eﬀect. The cannibalization eﬀect indicates that some consumers will
switch to buy from one of the innovator’s products to another of their products. For
literature covering the aspect of cannibalization, see, e.g., Aron and Lazear (1990)
and Moorthy and Png (1992). However, it is still unclear whether the cannibalization
eﬀect is restricted towards cases in which own products are direct neighbors, or if
it also applies for nonneighboring products, e.g., in case the innovator leapfrogs the
other firms’ product quality. Moreover, we may also expect these eﬀects to impact
firms diﬀerently.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our
model of new product introduction in a vertical diﬀerentiation setting. In Section
3, we provide a detailed analysis when the high-quality firm may introduce a new
product. Section 4 investigates when the low-quality firm is the innovator. We
conclude in section 5.
2 The Model
We consider an outset in which two firms (i = 1, 2) oﬀer each one product with
quality s, s ∈ <+ and s< s in the market.5 Thus, firm 1 is the low-quality and firm
2 is the high-quality provider. Since innovations frequently follow from inventions
made by the firm in related business fields, we assume that there is one firm which
benefits from a technological progress. The technological progress improves the
firm’s production technology and enables it to introduce a new product into the
market. Hence, we distinguish between two scenarios depending on which firm
is subject to technological progress: the high-quality firm may introduce a new
product, and the low-quality firm may introduce a new product. We assume the
new product quality to be higher than its existing product, si >s or s, if i = 1
or 2, respectively. We would like to stress that the assumption of introducing a
new product only of higher quality, is imposed without loss of generality.6 We can
distinguish between two quality areas: a low-quality area (s < si < s), and a high-
quality area (si > s).
We model a two-stage duopoly game.7 In the first stage, the innovator (firm i)
5The outset is based on the model by Choi and Shin (1992) which is a modification of Shaked
and Sutton (1982) in which the version of Tirole (1992) is used. The results are shown in Appendix
1.
6The assumption simplifies the analysis, as it rules out several innovation cases which will not
be part of the set of candidate equilibria. In general, the analysis holds for any new product with
quality si ∈ [0,∞) .
7Since we want to emphasize on the number of products oﬀered in the market, but not on the
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decides whether to keep or to withdraw its existing product from the market, having
introduced a new product with certain quality si. The innovator keeps the existing
product in the market, if
πki (s, s, si)− πwi (s, si) > 0 (1)
applies, with i = 1, 2 and s = s or s, if i = 1 or 2; πki and πwi denote firm i’s
profits, when it keeps or withdraws the existing product, respectively. In terms of
the number of products oﬀered in the market, the following cases may occur: the
innovator keeps the existing product in the market and three products are oﬀered;
the innovator withdraws the existing product from the market and two products are
oﬀered in the market.
In the second stage, firms maximize profits by simultaneously choosing prices
in the product market having observed the qualities and the number of products
oﬀered in the market. We distinguish between R&D costs depending on quality,
and production costs being independent of quality. No entry is assumed to occur.
Figure 1 shows the diﬀerent innovation cases.
Case a Product Locations Case b Case c
s2 high-quality area s1
s existing high-quality product s s
low-quality area s1
s existing low-quality product s s
New Product Introduction New Product Introduction
by the High-Quality Firm by the Low-Quality Firm
Figure 1: The Innovation Cases
Consumers’ preferences are given by U = θs − p if they buy a good and zero,
otherwise. Each consumer has the same ranking of qualities and prefers higher
quality for a given price p. Consumers diﬀer in their income. Their income parameter
θ is uniformly distributed over the interval [0, 1].8 The assumption on the income
parameter implies that the market is not covered which means that some consumers
do not buy any one of these products. Every consumer is allowed to buy at most
one of the products. We look for pure strategies and solve the game by applying
backward induction for every innovation case.
properties of the R&D cost functions, we abstract (without loss of generality) from endogenizing
quality.
8Another common assumption is the bimodular distribution. The uniform distribution is an
appropriate assumption for the electronics and telecommunications market. Otherwise, it might
be diﬃcult to explain very low preference for intermediate quality goods for the industries under
consideration.
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3 New Product Introduction by the High-Quality
Firm (Case a)
In what follows, when the high-quality firm is the innovator, we investigate the
product market competition (stage 2) in section 3.1 and derive prices, demand,
and profits. Section 3.2 investigates the innovator’s choice to keep or withdraw the
existing product (stage 1).
3.1 Product Market Competition - Stage 2
When the high-quality firm introduces a new product in the high-quality area, three
products with qualities s2 > s >s are oﬀered. Consequently, there are three indiﬀer-
ent consumers prevalent in the market. One of them is indiﬀerent between buying
the product with highest quality s2 or with second highest quality s from the high-
quality firm. The income parameter of this consumer is given by θ2 = (p2−p)(s2−s) . The
consumer who is indiﬀerent between buying the high-quality firm’s existing product
with quality s and the low-quality firm’s product with quality s is described by the
income parameter θ = (p−p)
(s−s) , whereas the income parameter θ=
p
s
represents the
consumer who is indiﬀerent between buying the product with lowest quality from
the low-quality firm and not buying at all. For the demand functions, we get
D2 (p, p2, s, s2) =
θ=1Z
θ2
f (θ) dθ = 1− (p2 − p)
(s2 − s)
, (2)
D
¡
p, p, p2, s, s, s2
¢
=
θ2Z
θ
f (θ) dθ = (p2 − p)
(s2 − s)
−
¡
p− p
¢
(s− s) , (3)
and
D
¡
p, p, s, s
¢
=
θZ
θ
f (θ) dθ =
¡
p− p
¢
(s− s) −
p
s
. (4)
Firms’ profit functions in stage 2 are given by
π(p,D) = pD (·) , and
πk2
¡
p,D, p2, D2
¢
= pD (·) + p2D2 (·) .
Each firm maximizes its profits with respect to its own product price. The first
order condition for the low-quality firm, is given by
∂π(p,D)
∂p ≡ 0 =⇒ p (p) =
ps
2s
.
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The first order condition for the high-quality firm with respect to the price of the
high-quality product, is as follows
∂πk2(p,D, p2, D2)
∂p2
≡ 0 =⇒ p2 (p) =
2p− s+ s2
2
,
and with respect to the price of its existing product, is given by
∂πk2(p,D, p2, D2)
∂p ≡ 0 =⇒ p
¡
p
¢
=
p− s+ s
2
.
The reaction functions are strictly monotone. Solving the first order conditions
yields the corresponding prices9
p(s, s) =
s (s− s)
4s− s , p(s, s) =
2s (s− s)
4s− s , and
p2(s, s, s2) =
4ss2 − s (s2 + 3s)
2 (4s− s) .
Substituting these into equations (2), (3), and (4) gives us the equivalent demand
D(s, s) =
s
4s− s, D(s, s) =
s
2 (4s− s) , and D2 =
1
2
.
Similarly, firms’ profits in the product market are
π(s, s) = ss (s− s)
(4s− s)2
, and
πk2(s, s, s2) =
ss (s− s)
(4s− s)2
+
4ss2 − s (3s+ s2)
4 (4s− s) . (5)
Equation (5) shows that firms’ profits depend on the product qualities and the
number of products in the market. Note, in case the innovator withdraws its existing
product each firm oﬀers one product and the results are similar to the outset adjusted
for the corresponding product quality s2 = s, see Appendix 1.
9See also Caplin and Nalebuﬀ (1991) regarding the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibria
in this setting.
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3.2 Keep or Withdraw - Stage 1
The innovator’s decision to keep or withdraw the existing product is analyzed, as
per equation (1). The main problem is given by the diﬃculty to explicitly solve
for quality, as the terms are often characterized by polynomials of high degrees.
Consequently, we are not able to compare the high-quality firm’s profits when it
keeps its product, as shown by equation (5), with the case when it withdraws, as
shown in Appendix 1, equation (10), adjusted for s = s2. Therefore, we implicitly
solve the system by parceling out the total eﬀects in several parts which makes the
analysis computationally tractable. We implicitly analyze the innovator’s decision
to keep or withdraw the existing product from its marginal profits with respect to
its existing product quality s. For illustrative purposes, we decompose the total
derivative of the reduced-form profit function into several eﬀects.10 The derivative
of the high-quality firm’s second-stage profit function with respect to its existing
product quality s, is given by11
dπk2
ds
=
+z}|{
∂πk2
∂D
+z}|{
∂D
∂p
+z}|{
dp
ds| {z }
strategic eﬀect
+
+z}|{
∂πk2
∂D
+z}|{
∂D
∂s| {z }
demand eﬀect
+
+z}|{
∂πk2
∂D2
−z}|{
∂D2
∂s| {z }
cannibalization eﬀect
(6)
=
6s2s
(4s− s)3| {z }
strategic eﬀect
+
s (s2 − 3ss− 2ss2 + 4ss2)
(s2 − s) (s− 4s)2| {z }
demand eﬀect
+
(s (3s+ s2)− 4ss2)
4 (s− 4s) (s− s2)| {z } > 0
cannibalization eﬀect
.
The incentive for the high-quality firm to withdraw its existing product with quality
s, is determined by three eﬀects.12 The strategic eﬀect indicates that decreasing the
existing product quality toughens price competition in the market. The demand ef-
fect refers to the fact that increasing the high-quality firm’s existing product quality
increases its profits through gaining on demand. The cannibalization eﬀect indicates
that keeping the existing product cannibalizes the new product’s demand which low-
ers the innovator’s profits. Some consumers will switch to buy the existing product
instead of purchasing the new product. Since the cannibalization eﬀect dominates
the demand eﬀect the existing product attracts less consumers than it cannibalizes
its new product’s demand. Therefore, keeping the existing product in the market
10Decomposing the marginal profits into several eﬀects will be necessary in later scenarios in
order to show the sign of the derivative.
11Second-stage optimization, implies
∂πk2
∂p2 = 0 and
∂πk2
∂p = 0. Thus, the eﬀect of s on π
k
2 through
the high quality firm’s price change can be ignored by applying the envelope theorem.
12A strategic eﬀect towards the innovator’s new product price does not appear since the innovator
internalizes price competition towards its own high quality product.
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cannibalizes the new product’s demand to a higher extent than the existing prod-
uct’s ability to attract customers. Moreover, as the strategic eﬀect dominates the
cannibalization eﬀect, the high-quality firm earns higher profits through relaxing
price competition and approaching the existing product quality towards the new
product with quality s2. The total derivative of the high-quality firm is positive,
indicating that its profits continuously increase in the quality of the existing prod-
uct. The extreme case when both product qualities are identical, is equivalent to
withdrawing the existing product from the market.
In other words, the high-quality firm is better oﬀ withdrawing its existing product
from the market in order to avoid cannibalization and to soften price competition.
In this case, two products are oﬀered in the market: the low-quality firm’s existing
product with quality s and the high-quality firm’s new product with quality s2. The
same results as in Appendix 1, setting s2 = s, apply. In case the high-quality firm
is the innovator, we obtain the following result.
Proposition 1 The high-quality firm always withdraws the existing product from
the market, after introducing a new product in the high-quality area.
In the next section, we investigate the innovation cases b and c when the low-
quality firm is the innovator.
4 New Product Introduction by the Low-Quality
Firm
In the following, we first analyze the case, when the low-quality firm may introduce
a new product in the low-quality are (case b), before we turn to the case, when the
high-quality firm may introduce a new product in the high-quality area (case c).
4.1 Low-Quality Innovation by the Low-Quality Firm
The results for the product market competition (stage 2) are shown in Appendix 2.
We proceed with investigating the low-quality firm’s choice to keep or withdraw the
existing product (stage 1).
4.1.1 Keep or Withdraw - Stage 1
In order to determine the low-quality firm’s decision to keep or withdraw the existing
product from the market, according to equation (1), we implicitly solve the system
by parceling out the total eﬀects in several parts. The total derivative of the low-
quality firm’s profit function with respect its product with quality s, given by
dπk1
ds
=
+z}|{
∂πk1
∂D
+z}|{
∂D
∂s| {z }
demand eﬀect
+
+z}|{
∂πk1
∂D1
−z}|{
∂D1
∂s| {z }
cannibalization eﬀect
(7)
8
=
s1 (s− s1)2
(s1 − s) (4s− s1)2| {z }
demand eﬀect
+
s1 (s− s1)2
(s− s1) (4s− s1)2| {z }
cannibalization eﬀect
. (8)
As we see in equation (7), marginal profits are determined by a demand and a
cannibalization eﬀect. The demand eﬀect shows that increasing the existing prod-
uct quality attracts more consumers. The cannibalization eﬀect shows that some
consumers will switch to buy the existing product instead of purchasing the new
product. As we see in equation (8), the cannibalization and the demand eﬀect are
balancing each other. However, the low-quality firm internalizes the strategic eﬀect
towards its own product by pricing the low-quality product relatively high, such that
no consumer will buy the existing product with lower quality, see equation (16) in
Appendix 2. Therefore, the low-quality firm’s decision is equivalent to withdrawing
the existing product from the market. Two products will be oﬀered in the market.
The same results as in Appendix 1 , with s1 =s apply.
4.2 High-Quality Innovation by the Low-Quality Firm
The results for the product market competition (stage 2) are shown in Appendix 3.
In the following, we concentrate on the innovator’s choice to keep or withdraw the
existing product (stage 1).
4.2.1 Keep or Withdraw - Stage 1
When the low-quality firm introduces a new product in the high-quality area, its
choice to keep or withdraw the existing product from the market is given by equation
(1). We analyze the total derivative of its profit function with respect to its existing
product quality s, given by
dπk1
ds
=
+z}|{
∂πk1
∂D
+z}|{
∂D
∂p
−z}|{
dp
ds| {z }
first strategic eﬀect
+
+z}|{
∂πk1
∂D1
+z}|{
∂D1
∂p
−z}|{
dp
ds| {z }+
second strategic eﬀect
+z}|{
∂πk1
∂D
+z}|{
∂D
∂s| {z }
demand eﬀect
(9)
=
3ss2 (s1 − s)3
2Ψ3| {z }
first strategic eﬀect
+
3s2 (s1 − s)2 (4ss1 − s (3s+ s1))
2Ψ3| {z }+
second strategic eﬀect
+
s2 (s1 − s)2
4 (s (s− 4s1) + s (2s+ s1))2| {z }
demand eﬀect
< 0
with Ψ = 2ss + s2+ss1 − 4ss1. Two negative strategic eﬀects and one positive de-
mand eﬀect determine the low-quality firm’s marginal profits. Both strategic eﬀects
indicate that price competition is softened towards the rival’s price by decreasing
the quality of the existing product. The relaxed price competition has a positive
9
impact on both the low-quality firm’s product demands. The demand eﬀect shows
that increasing the existing product quality attracts more consumers. No cannibal-
ization occurs in this scenario because the new product does not directly impact the
demand of its own existing product; only neighboring products do so. As shown in
equation (9), both strategic eﬀects dominate the demand eﬀect resulting in a total
negative eﬀect.
The low-quality firm earns higher profits by withdrawing the existing product
from the market in order to soften price competition, instead of keeping the existing
product and gaining on demand. As a result, two products are oﬀered in the market
and the same results as in Appendix 1 apply, setting s1 = s and s =s. When the
low-quality firm introduces a new product into the market (cases b and c) we obtain
the following result.
Proposition 2 The low-quality firm always withdraws the existing product after
introducing a new product in the low or high-quality area.
Taking all innovation cases together, we have shown that innovators withdraw
their existing product from the market in order to avoid cannibalizing its own product
demand or to soften price competition (strategic eﬀect) in the market.
5 Conclusion
In the context of a vertical product diﬀerentiation model with uniformly distributed
preferences, we explain firms’ optimal provision of products in the market. We
analyze if innovators better keep the existing product in the market in order to
discriminate among consumers, or if they rather withdraw their existing products
in order to avoid cannibalization and to soften price competition.
We can confirm that the basic result by Champsaur and Rochet (1989) also holds,
to some extent, in a pure vertical diﬀerentiation setting. As shown, the innovator
diﬀerentiates its products from those of its competitor in order to soften price com-
petition. However, we also show that innovators withdraw their existing products
close to its own goods in order to avoid cannibalizing their own product demand and
to soften price competition among its own products. We show that the strategic and
cannibalization eﬀects are so strong, that no room is left for discrimination (demand
eﬀect). An innovator always withdraws the existing product from the market and
earns higher profits despite a smaller variety of goods. Therefore, the gap between
the products is not limited towards intermediate qualities or rivals’ products as in
horizontal models, but also holds among its own products. Consequently, in contrast
to horizontally diﬀerentiated markets, firms are worse oﬀ to oﬀer a range or interval
of product qualities in vertically diﬀerentiated product markets.
It is interesting to note that our results also contributes to the literature on ‘dam-
aged goods’, as we can conclude that the distribution of quality preferences plays an
important role in determining firms’ decision to either keep or withdraw the existing
product. Prominent examples are Deneckere and McAfee (1996) and Johnson and
10
Myatt (2002). The literature on ‘damaged goods’, often based on a bimodal dis-
tribution of preferences for quality, suggests firms to keep their existing product in
the market. Our model which is based on the assumption of a uniform distribution
of preferences for quality is consistent with firms withdrawing the existing product
from the market.
Some industries, e.g., the Dynamic Random Access Memory industry, are char-
acterized by adjacent product generations simultaneously oﬀered in the market. For
further research it might be interesting to empirically investigate by how much firms’
profits increase when they withdraw their existing product generation, after they in-
troduced a new product generation. Moreover, it might be interesting to investigate
by how much their product qualities and their prices will change, due to their higher
profits earned in the product market.
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6 APPENDIX
Appendix 1: The Outset
The outset is based on the model by Choi and Shin (1992) which is a modification of
Shaked and Sutton (1982) where we use the version of Tirole (1992). The model is a
noncooperative two-stage game where two firms (i = 1, 2) simultaneously choose their
qualities in the first stage and given their qualities, they compete in the second stage with
prices in the product market.
Product qualities s, s with s< s are chosen from the following set of qualities, defined
as [0, es] where es is any finite number. Firm 1 is supposed to be the low-quality provider
and firm 2 is the high-quality provider. We focus on pure strategies. Consumers’ prefer-
ences are described in the model section above. After deriving the corresponding demand
functions, we get for the corresponding prices13
p (s, s) =
s (s− s)
4s− s , and p (s, s) =
2s (s− s)
4s− s .
For demand, we get
D (s, s) =
s
4s− s , and D (s, s) =
2s
4s− s.
Profits are
π (s, s) = ss (s− s)
(4s− s)2
, and π (s, s) = 4s
2 (s− s)
(4s− s)2
. (10)
Reduced-form profit functions are continuous and diﬀerentiable, given by
∂π (s, s)
∂s =
s2 (4s− 7s)
(4s− s)3
T 0 for s S 4
7
s, and (11)
∂π (s, s)
∂s =
4s (4s2 + 2s2 − 3ss)
(4s− s)3
> 0. (12)
∂π (s, s)
∂s =
s2 (s+ 2s)
(4s− s)3
> 0, and (13)
∂π (s, s)
∂s =
4s2 (s+ 2s)
(s− 4s)3
< 0. (14)
∂2π (s, s)
∂s2 < 0, and
∂2π (s, s)
∂s2 < 0. (15)
13See also Caplin and Nalebuﬀ (1991) regarding the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibria
in this setting.
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From equation (11), we see that the low-quality firm’s profits first increase in quality since
more consumers buy the new product (demand eﬀect). But the closer the product quality
is moved towards the competitor’s product the higher is the price competition (strategic
eﬀect) which decreases the low-quality firm’s profits. When both product qualities are
identical Bertrand competition drives firms’ profits to zero. The low-quality provider’s
optimal distance to the high-quality product is given by the point where the demand eﬀect
and the strategic eﬀect are balancing each other. The high-quality firm increases profits by
oﬀering a higher product quality. We get the result of ‘maximal product diﬀerentiation’
where in equilibrium firms maximally diﬀerentiate their products. The low-quality firm
oﬀers the lowest feasible product quality and the high-quality firm oﬀers the highest feasible
product quality.
Appendix 2: Low-Quality Innovation by the Low-Quality Firm (Case b)
In case b, the low-quality firm introduces a new product in the low-quality area s > s1
and keeps the existing product in the market. Firms’ profit functions are given by
πk1
¡
p,D, p1, D1
¢
= pD (·) + p1D1 (·) ,
π(p,D) = pD (·) .
Each firm maximizes its profit function with respect to its own product price. The first
order condition for the low-quality firm, with respect to its existing product price is given
by
∂πk1(p,D, p1, D1)
∂p ≡ 0 =⇒ p (p1) =
p1s
s1
and with respect to its new product price, internalizing the price eﬀect of its new product
price on its existing product price is given by
∂πk1(p,D, p1, D1)
∂p1
≡ 0 =⇒ p1 (p) =
ps1
2s
.
The first order condition for the high-quality firm, is
∂π(p,D)
∂p ≡ 0 =⇒ p (p1) =
p1 − s1 + s
2
.
The reaction functions are strictly monotone. Solving the first order conditions gives the
corresponding prices
p(s, s1, s) =
s (s− s1)
4s− s1
, p1(s1, s) =
s1 (s− s1)
4s− s1
,
and p(s1, s) =
2s (s− s1)
4s− s1
.
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The demand is
D (·) = 0, D1 (s1, s) = s
4s− s1
, and D =
2s
4s− s1
. (16)
Firms’ profits are as follows
πk1 (s1, s) =
s1s (s− s1)
(4s− s1)2
, and (17)
π (s1, s) =
4s2 (s− s1)
(4s− s1)2
. (18)
Appendix 3: High-Quality Innovation by the Low-Quality Firm (Case c)
In case c, the low-quality firm introduces a new product in the high-quality area s1 > s
and keeps the existing product in the market. Firms’ profit functions are given by
πk1(p,D, p1,D1) = pD (·) + p1D1 (·) and
π
¡
p,D
¢
= pD (·) .
Each firm maximizes its profit function with respect to its own product price. The first
order condition for the high-quality firm, is given by
∂π(p,D)
∂p ≡ 0 =⇒ p
¡
p
¢
=
p1 (s− s) + p (s1 − s)
2 (s1 − s)
.
The first order condition for the low-quality firm with respect to its existing product price
∂πk1
¡
p,D, p1, D1
¢
∂p ≡ 0 =⇒ p (p) =
ps
2s
,
and with respect to its new product price,
∂πk1
¡
p,D, p1, D1
¢
∂p1
≡ 0 =⇒ p1 (p) =
p+ s1 − s
2
.
The reaction functions are strictly monotone. Solving the first order conditions yields the
corresponding prices
p(s, s, s1) =
s (s− s) (s− s1)
2Ψ
, p(s, s, s1) =
s (s− s) (s− s1)
Ψ
,
p1(s, s, s1) =
(s1 − s)
2
³
1 + s(s−s)
3ss+ss1−4ss1
´ ,
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with Ψ = 2ss+ s2+ss1 − 4ss1. Substituting these gives us the equivalent demand
D(s, s, s1) =
s (s− s1)
2Ψ
, D(s, s, s1) =
s (s− s1)
Ψ
, and
D1(s, s, s1) =
(s (3s+ s1)− 4ss1)
2Ψ
.
Similarly, firms’ profits in the product market are
πk1(s, s, s1) =
s(s−s)s(s−s1)2
4Ψ2 +
(s1−s)(s(3s+s1)−4ss1)
4Ψ
³
1+ s(s−s)
(3ss+ss1−4ss1)
´ , and
π(s, s, s1) =
s2 (s− s) (s− s1) (s− s1)
Ψ2
. (19)
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